St. John's Law Review
Volume 60, Winter 1986, Number 2

Article 11

UCC 2-318: Implied Warranty Cause of Action Accrues When
Manufacturer or Distributor Tenders Delivery of Product Rather
Than When Product Is Sold to Plaintiff
Regina A. Matejka

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:399

UCC 2-318: Implied warranty cause of action accrues when manufacturer or distributor tenders delivery of product rather than
when product is sold to plaintiff.
In 1973, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine
of strict products liability, making it possible for injured plaintiffs
to sue remote parties in the distributive chain irrespective of the
presence of privity. 1 Two years later the New York State legislature amended section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) to eliminate completely privity requirements for personal
injury actions based on breach of warranty. 2 Since this amend' See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341-42, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461, 468-69 (1973). In Codling, the court held that "the manufacturer of a defective product
may be held liable to an innocent bystander, without proof of negligence, for damages sustained in consequence of the defect." Id. at 335, 298 N.E.2d at 624, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
Elimination of the need to prove negligence, it was argued, would promote greater care in
manufacturing. See id. at 341, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69; Mead v. Warner
Pruyn Div., Finch Pruyn Sales, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 782, 785, 386 N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (Sup. Ct.
Washington County 1976), aff'd, 57 App. Div. 2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1976); Accord First
Nat'l Bank of Alburquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., 88 N.M. 74, 86, 537 P.2d 682,
695 (1975); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (1974)
Before the recognition of strict tort liability in New York, a plaintiff was restricted to causes
of action in negligence and breach of warranty. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963) If the injury did not
occur within six years of the purchase and no negligence could be shown, the plaintiff would
have no recovery even though the goods were shown to be defective. See Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 344, 253 N.E.2d 207, 209 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969)
overruled in part, Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d
275, 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1975). See generally Note, Products Liability in New York:
Section 2-318 of the U.C.C. - The Amendment Without a Cause 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 61, 9092 (1981) (discussing anomalous distinction between statute of limitations for warranty actions and strict liability actions).
- N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1981). The current version of section 2-318 provides in
pertinent part:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty...
Id. The original version of U.C.C. 2-318 adopted by New York (Alternative A) extended the
seller's warranty only to the buyer and members of the buyer's family or household. See
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964). The scarce legislative history available on the amendment indicates that its purpose was "to extend more intelligently the warranty provided to a
purchaser of goods under the UCC." Memorandum of Assem. Silverman, reprinted in
[1975] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 110. The amendment was prompted by concern over the fact that
many persons were deprived of redress when injured by defective products merely because
they were not the original purchasers of the products. See id.
After the adoption of strict liability in New York, there was some question as to
whether warranty still existed as an independent basis of recovery for personal injury cases,
at least when the injured plaintiff was not in privity. Note, supra note 1 at 85-86. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d 97, 99-100, 403 N.Y.S.2d
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ment, implied warranty actions under section 2-318 and strict
products liability actions in tort have become intertwined.3 The
only relevant distinction between the two actions is the limitations
period governing each; the statute of limitations for strict tort liability is three years from the time of injury,4 while the corresponding period for breach of warranty is four years from "tender of delivery." 5 However, in the absence of a privity requirement for
185, 187-88 (1978); SIEGEL § 41, Supp. at 13. In Martin, a case governed by the original
version of section 2-318, the Court of Appeals indicated in dictum that 2-318 relief would be
inappropriate for a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant. See 43 N.Y.2d at 590, 374
N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.2d at 188. But cf. Singer v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 112
Misc. 2d 781, 784, 447 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584-85 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (case governed by
amended version of 2-318 in which court expressly declined to give effect to dicta in Martin
opinion).
-1See J. BEASLEY, PRODucTs LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT
44 (1981); W. PROSSER & P. KEaTON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (5th ed. 1984); 3 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:50 at 154 (1983) (theories of strict liability and implied
warranty intertwined); cf. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 402, 335
N.E.2d 275, 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1975) (strict products liability is essentially implied
warranty action). In both strict products liability and warranty actions a plaintiff not in
privity with the defendant can recover for personal injuries. See Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464-70 (1973). In addition,
contributory fault, see CPLR §§ 1412, 1413, is a defense to actions in both strict liability,
see Codling, 32 N.Y.2d at 343, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471-72, and implied
warranty, see Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 382,
348 N.E.2d 571, 575, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118-119, (1976); 1 NEW YORK CIvI PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, 2:120 (1974 & Supp. 1984) Supp. at 156. But cf. Titlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc.,
75 App. Div. 2d 985, 986, 429 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92-93 (4th Dep't 1980) (only the negligence of
buyer in privity affects recovery on an implied warranty claim).
The primary practical difference between the two actions is the length of the limitations
period; see infra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, damages for economic
loss may only be recovered in an action predicated on warranty. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2715(2)(b) (McKinney 1981); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp., 81 App. Div. 2d
221, 227-34, 439 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-40 (1st Dep't 1981) (Silverman, J., dissenting), rev'd 56
N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982).
CPLR 214(4)-(5). Section 214 of the CPLR provides that an action to recover damages for personal injury must be commenced within three years. Id.; see also Victorson v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). In Victorson, the court held that the statute of limitations prescribed in § 214 was applicable to a
strict liability action and that it began to run at the date the plaintiff, a remote user, was
injured by the extractor machine which defendant laundromat had purchased 21 years earlier. Id. at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The court proceeded to overrule
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 494
(1969), Victorson, 37 N.Y.2d at 399-400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40, which had
held that the plaintiff's personal injury action ran from the date of installation of the glass
doors which caused her injury, not at the moment of her injury. Mendel, 25 N.Y.2d at 344,
253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493. The Mendel holding produced the anomalous result
that the plaintiff's action was time-barred before her right to prosecute it had been perfected. WK&M 214.13.
5 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). Section 2-725 provides in pertinent part:
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implied warranty actions it has been unclear whether "tender of
delivery" refers to the date of delivery by the manufacturer or distributor to its immediate purchaser, or to the date of retail delivery to the consumer.' Recently, in Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor
Corp.,7 the New York Court of Appeals held that, notwithstanding
the elimination of the privity requirement, a cause of action in implied warranty against a manufacturer or distributor accrues on
the date the party charged tenders delivery of the product, not on
the date that some third party sells it to plaintiff.8
In Heller, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred on July 7, 1979.1 On February 15,
1983, the plaintiff instituted a products liability action for breach
of express and implied warranties against U.S. Suzuki Motor
Corp., the Japanese manufacturer's distributor of the motorcycle,
and Jim Moroney's Harley Davidson Sales, Inc., the retailer. 10 Special Term dismissed defendant Suzuki's affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations and denied its motion for summary judgment, holding that the cause of action against the distributor accrued when the retailer sold the motorcycle to the plaintiff on
April 21, 1979, and that the action was timely, having been commenced within four years of that date."' The Appellate Division,
Second Department, reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on March 30, 1978,
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made...
Id.
6 Note, supra, note 1 at 81-82. The majority rule seems to be that the accrual date is
the date of retail tender. Id. at 82, and n.111. Compare Patterson v. Her Majesty's Indus.,
450 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (limitations period under U.C.C. 2-725 accrues on
retail sale date) with Doyle v. Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, Inc., 90 App. Div. 2d 366, 370,
457 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (2d Dep't 1982) (§ 2-725 limitations period accrues on date of original
sale).
64 N.Y.2d 407, 477 N.E.2d 434, 488 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1985).
B Id. at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
Id. at 407, 477 N.E.2d at 435, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
"0 Id. The tort causes of action against both defendants in Heller were barred by the
three year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. Id. see generally supra
note 4. Therefore, the plaintiff sought to recover on express and implied warranties that the
motorcycle was both merchantable and fit for its intended use. Heller, 64 N.Y.2d at 409,
477 N.E.2d at 435, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
11See 64 N.Y.2d at 410, 477 N.E. 2d at 435, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
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when the distributor tendered delivery of the motorcycle to its immediate purchaser, and that the action was therefore time12
barred.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 13 Writing for the court,
Judge Simons expressed the view that the 1975 amendment of
U.C.C. section 2-318 was "not entirely necessary"' 4 in light of the
court's earlier adoption of a strict products liability doctrine. 5 The
court also noted that when the legislature amended section 2-318,
it did not amend section 2-725, which prescribes the limitations
period for breach of warranty actions.'" Judge Simons reasoned
that despite the elimination of privity, it remains the rule that a
cause of action against a manufacturer or distributor accrues "on
the date the party charged tenders delivery of the product, not on
the date some third party sells it to plaintiff.' 1 7 Judge Simons
maintained that this interpretation of section 2-725 comports with
the purposes behind the enactment of the four-year statute of limitations; namely, to eliminate jurisdictional variations in limitations
periods and to fix a limitations period that would be consistent
with modern business record keeping procedures. 18 The court ex12

Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 101 App. Div. 2d 807, 807, 475 N.Y.S.2d 147, 147-

48 (2d Dep't 1984). The motorcycle was manufactured in Japan and distributed in the
United States by U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp. Heller, 64 N.Y.2d at 409, 477 N.E.2d at 435, 488
N.Y.S.2d at 133. Suzuki's immediate purchaser was Bakers Recreational Equipment, Inc.,
who then apparently transferred the motorcycle to Jim Moroney's Harley Davidson Sales,
Inc., the retailer from whom the plaintiff made the purchase. Id. at 409-10, 477 N.E.2d at
435, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
"3See 64 N.Y.2d at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 437, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 135. Chief Judge Wachtler
and Judges Kaye and Alexander concurred with Judge Simons. Judge Meyer dissented in an
opinion in which Judge Jasen concurred. Id. at 418, 477 N.E.2d at 441, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
See 64 N.Y.2d at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
" 64 N.Y.2d at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The court reasoned that
although the U.C.C. was amended to enable consumers to sue remote parties, consumers in
New York already had that capability by virtue of Codling v. Paglia.Id. See supra note 1.
1664 N.Y.2d at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134. See generally supra note 5
and accompanying text.
17 64 N.Y.2d at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The Court conceded that
from the legislature's excision of privity requirements from section 2-318 one could infer
that the intended date of accrual was the date of retail sale, but maintained that if the
legislature had intended such a change, it would have so stated. Id.
18 Id. at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 436-37, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134-35. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725
(McKinney 1964) Official Comment:
Purposes: To introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus
eliminating the jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief for concerns
doing business on a nationwide scale . . . This [four-year period] is within the
normal commercial record keeping period.
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plained that if the date of accrual was the date of retail sale, the
period of exposure to liability would become unpredictable and the
purposes of the Act would be frustrated. 9
Dissenting, Judge Meyer rejected the court's contention that
the 1975 amendment of U.C.C. section 2-318 was unnecessary in
light of New York's recognition of a strict products liability doctrine,20 and argued that the amendment afforded the consumer an
additional cause of action in warranty against the manufacturer.2 '
Judge Meyer also criticized the court's restrictive interpretation of
the statutory phrase "tender of delivery. '22 The dissent reasoned
that there can be no warranty running from the manufacturer to
the consumer until there is a consumer; therefore, "tender of delivery" to the consumer brings the manufacturer's warranty into operation. 3 Judge Meyer cautioned that the court's construction of
section 2-725 was inconsistent with the Code's stated policy of liberal construction and could bar a plaintiff's cause of action before
it ever came into existence.24
As a result of the court's decision in Heller, privity of contract
in warranty actions is now a prerequisite to the full four-year limitations period prescribed by U.C.C. section 2-725.5 However, nu,0 64 N.Y.2d at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 437, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 135. The Heller court claimed
that its interpretation did not limit available remedies, 64 N.Y.2d at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 437,
488 N.Y.S.2d at 134, and that a consumer who acts in a timely manner against immediate
and remote parties can recover on theories of express or implied warranty, negligence, or
strict products liability. Id. at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 437, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
20 Id. at 413, 477 N.E. 2d at 438, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (Meyer, J. dissenting).
21 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 413-14, 477 N.E.2d at 438, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The Heller dissent maintained
that the legislature is presumed to have been aware of Codling when it amended § 2-318,
and that therefore it intended to give the consumer a new cause of hction not dependent
upon proof of negligence, as is strict liability under Codling, but upon proof of breach of
warranty. Id. at 414, 477 N.E.2d at 438, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
" Id. at 414, 477 N.E.2d at 438, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
24 64 N.Y.2d at 415-16, 477 N.E.2d at 439, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
The dissent also noted that by adopting a strict liability action that runs from the date of
injury, New York accepted the notion that neither unpredictability of exposure to liability
nor record keeping procedures are sufficiently significant to dictate a limitations period. Id.
at 416, 477 N.E.2d at 439-40, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38. Finally, the dissent observed that the
weight of authority in New York and other jurisdictions supports an interpretation of
U.C.C. § 2-725 that fixes the date of retail sale as the accrual date of the four-year limitations period. Id. at 417, 477 N.E.2d at 440, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
25 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. It is now the law in New York that the
limitations period prescribed in U.C.C. § 2-725 accrues upon the first commercial tender of
delivery. See id. It is submitted that the practical result of this is that the limitations period
begins to run at that date whether or not a potential plaintiff has purchased the product.
Each day that elapses between the commercial sale and the purchase by the ultimate con-
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merous courts have held that strict construction of U.C.C. notice
and disclaimer provisions against consumers is improper because
of recognized distinctions between lay persons and commercial
buyers.2 6 This philosophy should, it is submitted, be extended to
cases involving section 2-725.17 While the court claimed that its insumer diminishes the consumer's limitations period by an equivalent amount of time. It is
therefore conceivable that when a product is "on the shelf" for a four-year period, the consumer's warranty action against the manufacturer under U.C.C. § 2-318 will be time-barred
before he even purchases the product. Therefore, it is submitted that the Heller court's
interpretations of sections 2-318 and 2-725 produce an inharmonious result. If vertical privity is unnecessary to a warranty remedy under § 2-318, it should not be read into § 2-318
through another section of the Code which delineates the mode of remedy enforcement.
As the dissent indicated, the Heller majority is effectively reinstating the "Mendel result" in which a cause of action accrues before the plaintiff's right to sue has been perfected.
See 64 N.Y.2d at 415, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J., dissenting). see
also Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1969), overruledin part, Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d
275, 375 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1975); supra note 4. The rationale was aptly explained by Judge
Frank in Kincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952):
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a
house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action
before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the
plaintiff.
Id. at 823 (Frank, J., dissenting), quoted in Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 64 N.Y.2d
407, 415 n.4, 477 N.E.2d 434, 439 n.4, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 137 n.4 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
26 See, e.g., Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 407, 335 N.E.2d 275,
283, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 47 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (reasonable time for notification
from retail consumer judged by different standard than for consumer and disclaimer provisions read permissively in view of unconscionability doctrine); Fischer v. Mead Johnson
Laboratories, 41 App. Div. 2d 737, 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (2d Dep't 1973) (notification
provision better suited for commercial transactions than for retail sales); Velez v. Craine &
Clark Lumber Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 747, 748, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (2d Dep't 1973) (consumer plaintiff not party to sale of defective lumber, therefore section 2-316 disclaimer not a
bar to recovery). The Code's permissiveness in section 2-316 should be read both in the light
of subdivision 2 of section 2-719, which states that limitations of liability for damages in
personal injury cases are prima facie unconscionable, as well as section 2-302, which gives
courts the power to apply the doctrine of unconscionability as a matter of law to any contractual matter which calls for it. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d at
407, 335 N.E.2d at 281, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). See also N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1981) (seller's express or implied warranties as extended by 2-318
may not be limited pursuant to 2-719).
217
In certain respects, the policy justification for the notice requirement in 2-316 and
the statute of limitations in 2-725 are similar, namely, both provisions are intended to protect the defendant (i.e. the seller or manufacturer in a products liability case) against the
assertion of stale claims. See Courtesy Enters. v. Richard Labs,
Ind. App.,
457
N.E.2d 572, 577 (1983) (final policy consideration behind notice requirement is that it is
required to discourage assertion of stale claims in same way and for same reasons as statute
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terpretation of section 2-725 does not limit available remedies,2"
the language of the decision indicates a pronounced bias toward
the use of strict tort remedies and against the use of warranty remedies in cases of personal injury. 9 It is therefore submitted that
the Heller decision may mark the inception of a trend in which the
court will continue to place obstacles, both procedural and substantive, in the path of consumers seeking to bring personal injury
suits based on breach of warranty. Moreover, the practical effect of
the Helter decision is to frustrate the legislative purpose, embodied
in the present version of section 2-318, of providing plaintiffs with
an additional cause of action against remote seller.30
Regina A. Matejka

UCC 1-207: Section 1-207 supersedes the common law doctrine of
accord and satisfactionin situations involving the tender of negotiable instruments in full satisfaction of disputed claims
In New York, the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been recognized as a means by which parties could settle
disputed debts without resort to judicial intervention.1 Under this
of limitations); B. CLARK & C. SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 9.01(2) at 9-7, 9-8
(policy behind notice provision and statute of limitations similar in that both place a time
limit on seller's exposure to warranty liability); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-10 at 422 (2d ed. 1982). It is suggested therefore that the support for a
liberal construction of the notice requirement in consumer injury cases could similarly justify a liberal construction of section 2-725 in such cases (i.e., a determination that the limitations period accrues on delivery to the retail consumer).
" See Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 64 N.Y.2d at 412, 477 N.E.2d at 437, 488
N.Y.S.2d at 134; supra note 22.
29 See Heller, 64 N.Y.2d at 410-11, 477 N.E.2d at 437, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 135. "As we
noted in Martin u. Dierck Equip. Co.. .. there is no need to recognize an action on implied
warranty for personal injuries, and contend with the serious conceptual problems which
arise when it is applied to personal injury actions, if the jurisdiction recognizes a tort action
in strict products liability as New York does ....
The tort remedy permits the injured
plaintiff to seek redress from remote parties in the distributive chain regardless of privity."
Id. [citation omitted]
40 See Heller, 64 N.Y.2d at 415-16, 477 N.E.2d at 438, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).

See Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 171, 179 N.E. 373, 374 (1932) (Cardozo C.J.); Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N.Y. 326, 329-30, 42 N.E. 715, 716 (1896); Jaffray v.
Davis, 124 N.Y. 164, 173, 26 N.E. 351, 354 (1891). The doctrine of accord and satisfaction

